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TEACHING PATENTS AS REAL OPTIONS* 
ANDREW CHIN** 
As a framing device for an introductory course in patent law, the 
study of patent valuation can deepen students’ understandings of 
patents as business assets and as instruments of industrial policy. In 
particular, the real options approach to patent valuation highlights 
patent owners’ strategic postures toward future income 
opportunities in the face of legal uncertainty and change. This 
Article describes the author’s experience with teaching patent 
valuation in connection with a show-and-tell exercise in which 
students consider the economic role of patents in markets for 
products they have purchased. The exercise utilizes an online 
calculator designed by the author to foster student intuitions 
regarding the financial implications of characterizing the option to 
commercialize a patent as an American call option. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although the decision to seek a patent is ultimately a business 
decision,1 entrepreneurs with new technological ideas are prudent to 
seek legal advice early regarding whether to patent and what is worth 
patenting. Successful technology startups must focus their limited time 
and resources on acquiring a relatively small number of patents that will 
create enough long-term value to justify their short-term costs.2 Once 
this patent portfolio has been acquired, it must be strategically managed 
in the face of changing market, technological, and legal conditions.3 The 
ability to advise a client regarding the economic value of its existing and 
prospective patent rights should be considered an essential part of every 
patent attorney’s skill set. 
Typically, however, law students have little opportunity to receive 
training in the economic valuation of patents before entering the 
practice of patent law. The topic is not covered on the patent bar 
examination or in leading patent law casebooks.4 While the largest 
patent law firms may have sufficient expertise to provide in-house 
training in valuation issues and methodologies,5 most attorneys must 
 
 1. See Certain Optical Disk Controller Chips and Chipsets and Prods. Containing Same, 
Including DVD Players and PC Optical Storage Devices II, USITC Pub. 26, Inv. No. 337-TA-
523, 2005 WL 482887, at *16 (Feb. 22, 2005) (“[A] decision whether or not to seek a patent, 
even if based partially on legal advice, is generally abusiness [sic] decision and, as such, is not 
privileged.”). 
 2. See Jeff Seul, Current Business and Legal Trends in the Organization, Funding, and 
Operation of Emerging Technology Companies, in REPRESENTING EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON GUIDING BUSINESSES AND INVESTORS 
THROUGH THE TECH START-UP PROCESS 7, 19–20 (2014) (“Patents are competitive business 
assets and legal tools, and not everything that could be patented is strategic enough from a 
business perspective to justify the costs (money and personnel time) to a resource constrained 
start-up	.	.	.	. A good patent attorney is someone who not only has a relevant technical 
background and great legal credentials and experience, but is also someone who can see the 
forest for the trees and can help clients recognize which inventions, if protected by patents, 
will create long-term value by helping keep potential competitors out of the company’s 
technology and/or market space.”). 
 3. See generally Martin A. Bader, Strategic Management of Patent Portfolios, 42 LES 
NOUVELLES 552, 552–54 (2007) (describing a leading approach to strategic patent portfolio 
management). 
 4. See MARTIN J. ADELMAN, RANDALL R. RADER & JOHN R. THOMAS, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW, at vii–xv (4th ed. 2015) (table of contents); F. SCOTT KIEFF ET 
AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW, at xix–xxviii (6th ed. 2013) (same); ROBERT PATRICK 
MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY, at iii–xv (5th ed. 2011) 
(same); CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS, at xi–xix (3d ed. 2014) (same); Manual 
of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), USPTO.GOV (Nov. 2015), https://www.uspto.gov/web
/offices/pac/mpep/ [https://perma.cc/GMS5-G4CZ] (same). 
 5. See, e.g., Patent Portfolio Management, FISH & RICHARDSON, http://www.fr.com
/services/patent-law/patent-portfolio-management/ [https://perma.cc/82LN-CFJQ] (listing 
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develop a working understanding of patent valuation from their own 
intuitions and practice experiences. A patent law course that guides 
students through the logic of patent valuation in a practice setting could 
thereby introduce future attorneys to a versatile set of tools for diverse 
client counseling tasks. 
This Article provides rationales and resources for covering the topic 
of patent valuation, with particular attention to the real options 
valuation approach, as part of the intellectual property curriculum in law 
school. Part I discusses the motivation for a classroom exercise involving 
patents that elicits and uses the students’ perspectives as consumers of 
patent products as motivation for patent valuation analysis. Part II 
describes the basic financial model that analogizes the valuations of 
patents to those of real options and some of the legal insights that may 
emanate from this model. Part III documents the features of a web-
based calculator that can support student intuitions and classroom 
discussions throughout the semester regarding the determinants of 
patent valuation under the real options approach. 
I.  CURRICULUM 
The bulk of the patent law course is devoted to teaching the legal 
requirements for a valid patent in painstaking detail.6 I have found it 
pedagogically worthwhile to preface this sequence with an appeal to a 
more fundamental motivation for studying the law of patent validity. 
Patent law students are perennially drawn to what I refer to as the 
alchemy of patent practice: the possibility of putting words to paper in 
such a way as to create an instrument conferring new and valuable 
rights. As consumers and observers of patented products in the 
marketplace, students begin the course ready to explore the economic 
dimensions of patent valuation. This Part describes some of the 
approaches I have taken to facilitate that exploration. 
A. Patents in the Classroom 
Ever since I started teaching Patent Law at the University of North 
Carolina School of Law in 2001, I have begun the course with a show-
and-tell exercise in which students bring in patented products and their 
 
thirty-eight principal attorneys and ten associate attorneys as members of Fish & Richardson’s 
patent portfolio management team as of January 22, 2017). 
 6. See generally, e.g., ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 67–550 (covering statutory 
requirements for patent validity); KIEFF ET AL., supra note 4, at 149–792 (same); MERGES & 
DUFFY, supra note 4, at 67–796 (same); NARD, supra note 4, at 59–500 (same). 
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associated patents to discuss in small groups.7 The exercise provides a 
hands-on introduction to the components of a patent document and the 
role of patent claims, as well as an early opportunity for classmates to 
meet and interact with each other in a practice setting. The students’ 
inherent interest in the technologies underlying their own household 
items and the market forces influencing their own consumer behavior 
ensures a high level of engagement. 
In observing these small group conversations over the years, I have 
increasingly seen my students show a particular interest in valuation 
issues. Discussions about the products’ commercial successes have led to 
vigorous debates about the extent to which patented features 
contributed to the students’ purchase decisions. Group members have 
informed each other about similar products that could compete with 
their patented products. Some students have noted that their patents 
were nearing expiration (or had already expired), while others have 
wondered whether emerging technologies might render their patents 
obsolete before their respective expiration dates. Several have reported 
that their inventions have seemed obvious, and many have 
acknowledged difficulties when asked to distinguish their patents from 
examples of patents that were allowed to expire for failure to pay 
maintenance fees.8 In critically assessing their patents’ strengths and 
weaknesses with their small groups, students have expressed 
sophisticated economic intuitions about patents in the marketplace and 
called into question the popular notion that patent rights inherently 
confer monopoly power.9 
 
 7. I ask the students to inform me of their choices a day in advance so that I can prepare 
materials to supplement the discussion. 
 8. The most recent examples of patents allowed to expire due to failure to pay a 
maintenance fee can be found in the notices section of the Official Gazette of the U.S. Patent 
& Trademark Office. See Official Gazette Notices–2016, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov
/learning-and-resources/official-gazette/official-gazette-notices-2016 [https://perma.cc/SYG2-
KG5E]; cf. Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1525, 1531 
(2005) (using a patentee’s failure to pay maintenance fees as an “objective and systematic way 
to identify worthless patents” and showing that worthless patents on average have fewer 
claims, fewer prior art references, fewer related applications, and shorter prosecution times). 
 9. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 39–45 (2006) (reappraising 
presumption that patents confer market power); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of 
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 996 (1997) (“In economic 
terms, intellectual property rights prevent competition in the sale of the particular work or 
invention covered by the intellectual property right, and therefore allow the intellectual 
property owner to raise the price of that work above the marginal cost of reproducing it.”); id. 
at 996 n.26 (“This does not mean that intellectual property rights automatically confer market 
power or create ‘monopolies’ in an economic or antitrust sense, as some courts have 
erroneously presumed.”); see also Simone A. Rose, Patent “Monopolyphobia”: A Means of 
Extinguishing the Fountainhead?, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 509, 530–34 (1999) (providing a 
historical survey of judicial hostility to the “monopoly” power conferred by patent rights). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1433 (2017) 
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B. Patent Valuation as a Frame for Class Discussions 
After the students have reported back from their small groups to 
the full class, I have used their comments as the basis for further 
discussions throughout the semester on the legal and economic 
principles underlying patent valuation. Using patent valuation as a 
framing device for the patent law course provides many significant 
pedagogical benefits. It motivates discussions regarding strategic 
decisions in patent prosecution and litigation. It deepens the students’ 
understanding of patents as business assets and as instruments of 
industrial policy. It provides an auxiliary gateway into patent law and 
policy for students with nontechnical business backgrounds, aptitudes, 
and interests. It highlights the role of patent law in business counseling 
and planning. It suggests ways attorneys can create and demonstrate 
added value for clients in an increasingly competitive landscape for 
patent practice. It facilitates teaching of the important, but often 
omitted, topic of patent damages. It could even provide students of 
patent law with comparative expertise over valuation practitioners who 
lack legal training in the analysis of patent claims.10 
Additionally, eliciting student interest in patent valuation with a 
show-and-tell exercise at the beginning of the semester provides a 
further benefit: it provides the students with an early “law in action”11 
perspective on the patent system as consumers of patented products. 
This serves as an immediate practical application of their introductory 
readings on the economic justifications for patents and the exclusionary 
nature of patent rights. 
C. Approaches to Patent Valuation 
The value of a patent derives from the exploitation of the right it 
confers: namely, “the right to exclude others from making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or 
importing the invention into the United States[.]”12 This right is “nothing 
but a negative right of exclusion”13 and therefore does not necessarily 
 
 10. See Malcolm T. Meeks & Charles A. Eldering, Patent Valuation: Aren’t We Forgetting 
Something? Making the Case for Claims Analysis in Patent Valuation by Proposing a Patent 
Valuation Method and a Patent-Specific Discount Rate Using the CAPM, 9 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 194, 196 (2010) (observing that most patent valuation techniques fail to 
conduct “an analysis of the most important part of a patent—its claims”). 
 11. See generally Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 
(1910) (coining the phrase “law in action” and providing the classic statement of the 
distinction between the formal sources of law and the social practices of legal administration). 
 12. 35 U.S.C. §	154(a)(1) (2012). 
 13. Chi. & A. Ry. Co. v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 243 F. 883, 890 (7th Cir. 1917) (“[A] 
patent conveys nothing but a negative right of exclusion. It is the right to exclude others, but 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1433 (2017) 
1438 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
permit an inventor to commercialize the invention in the United States 
market.14 Despite this, patent valuations often estimate not only the 
value a patent owner might derive from suing for infringement or selling 
immunity from suit in the form of a license,15 but also the rents 
associated with the patent owner’s power to exclude competition from 
the market for a commercial embodiment of the invention.16 
There are three basic approaches to patent valuation, generally 
referred to as cost methods, market methods, and income methods.17 
Cost methods infer the value of a patent from the cost of developing the 
patented technology and the cost of obtaining and maintaining the 
patent.18 Market methods utilize valuation information from the price-
setting activities of buyers and sellers in competitive markets for the 
patent itself, for comparable assets, or for shares of stock or other 
indicators of the patent’s value in the context of the firm’s other assets.19 
Income methods estimate the total present value of the net economic 
benefits the patent will generate over time, including profits from 
market power attributable to the patent rights and royalties from patent 
assertion or licensing.20 
Accessible introductions to the cost, market, and income 
approaches can be found in any of the leading surveys on patent 
 
not the natural right to make, use, and sell, which the patentee obtains from his general 
ownership of the materials employed, not from the government.”); see also Giles S. Rich, The 
Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 21, 26–27 
(2004) (explaining that the right to make, use, and sell is “the ‘natural’ right of man” and that 
the government can therefore grant no more than “the right to exclude others from making, 
using or vending the patented invention”). 
 14. See Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 321, 330 (2009) (explaining that blocking patents or administrative regulations may 
prevent a patent owner from commercializing the patented invention). 
 15. See Chi. & A. Ry. Co., 243 F. at 890 (“[T]he licensee does not obtain [a] right to make, 
use and sell from the license, but only immunity from suit by the licensor.”). 
 16. See WILLIAM J. MURPHY, JOHN L. ORCUTT & PAUL C. REMUS, PATENT 
VALUATION: IMPROVING DECISION MAKING THROUGH ANALYSIS 107 (2012) (“Patent 
rights provide the patentee with what economists refer to as market power.”); id. (“When 
valuing the patent rights for an invention under the classic incentive theory, the valuator is 
trying to calculate the value of the extra profits that come from excluding competitors.”). 
 17. See id. at 16. This taxonomy of the basic approaches to patent valuation has been 
credited to Russell Parr and Gordon Smith. See Robert Pitkethly, The Valuation of Patents:A 
Review of Patent Valuation Methods with Consideration of Option Based Methods and the 
Potential for Further Research 6 (Judge Inst. of Mgmt. Studies, Judge Inst. Working Paper No. 
21/97, 1997) (citing Russell L. Parr & Gordon V. Smith, Quantitative Methods of Valuing 
Intellectual Property, in THE NEW ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMERCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS 39, 49–61 (Melvin Simensky & Lanning Bryer eds., 1994)), 
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mast0140/EJWP0599.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8BV-U3YV]. 
 18. See MURPHY ET AL., supra note 16, at 19, 225. 
 19. See id. at 18, 189–91. 
 20. See id. at 16–18, 131–34. 
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valuation21 and assigned as supplemental reading. With this background 
in hand, students are able to brainstorm about readily accessible sources 
of information that might be relevant to each approach. Concerning the 
cost approach, students have generally struggled to obtain historic data 
on the costs of research and development associated with a patented 
technology. Some students have found the market approach more 
promising. While transaction data involving similar patents usually is not 
readily available,22 these students have determined the market 
capitalization of publicly traded patent owners and perused recent press 
releases and annual reports for information regarding the relative 
financial significance of the patent in question. Overall, however, 
students have found the income approach the most amenable to 
calculation, using diverse information sources as inputs to estimate the 
earnings attributable to the patent covering their product.23 Following 
one of these approaches, each student is asked to formulate low and 
high estimates of their patent’s present (i.e., postcommercialization) 
valuation, together with an estimate of the probability that the actual 
value ultimately derived from the patent before expiration will fall 
between the two estimates. 
While students find this introduction to the valuation research 
process informative and productive, they conclude the exercise with 
varying degrees of confidence in their own calculations. They might be 
 
 21. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN GRUBE, MEASURING THE IMMEASURABLE: VALUING PATENT 
PROTECTION OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES 119–29 (2009); 
MURPHY ET AL., supra note 16, at 16–19; Heinz Goddar & Ulrich Moser, Traditional 
Valuation Methods: Cost, Market and Income Approach, in THE ECONOMIC VALUATION OF 
PATENTS 109, 109–13 (Federico Munari & Raffaele Oriani eds. 2011); Shigeki Kamiyama, 
Jerry Sheehan & Catalina Martinez, Valuation and Exploitation of Intellectual Property 26–28 
(OECD Directorate for Sci., Tech. and Indus., Working Paper No. 2006/5, 2006), https://www
.oecd.org/sti/sci-tech/37031481.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4W7-F5C2]; Pitkethly, supra note 17, at 
5–8; Liina Tonisson & Lutz Maicher, Patents, Their Importance and Valuation Methods 10–16 
(Fraunhofer MOEZ, Working Paper No. 3/2012, 2012), https://www.imw.fraunhofer.de
/content/dam/moez/de/documents/Working_Paper/Working-Paper-3.pdf [https://perma.cc
/U9VD-KATY]. 
 22. See MURPHY ET AL., supra note 16, at 194 (“One of the greatest information 
problems for market-based patent valuation methods is the dearth of publicly disclosed patent 
transactions.”); Krista F. Holt, Brian P. O’Shaughnessy & Thomas B. Herman, What’s It 
Worth? Principles of Patent Valuation, LANDSLIDE, Sept.–Oct. 2015, at 33, 35; Kamiyama et 
al., supra note 21, at 27 (“Given the uniqueness of patents, third party arm’s length 
transactions involving similar patents are infrequent.”); see also Mark A. Lemley & Nathan 
Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 257, 257–58 (2007) (proposing 
legislation to require publication of patent assignment and license terms after noting that a 
patent licensee often has no idea if it is “getting a good deal” because “[e]ven if that patent or 
ones like it have been licensed dozens of times before, the terms of those licenses, including 
the price itself, will almost invariably be confidential”). 
 23. See infra Section III.A (presenting examples of student calculations). 
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reassured to know that experts are typically retained to produce more 
sophisticated and detailed patent valuation reports,24 and even expert 
calculations are subject to uncertainty25 and the “garbage-in, garbage-
out” principle.26 At the same time, an acquaintance with the valuation 
process can help an attorney not only in deciding whether to retain a 
valuation expert27 and in interpreting an expert’s findings,28 but also in a 
host of other strategic decisions regarding patent acquisition, assertion, 
and management.29 
Most students will recognize, and often a student will spontaneously 
point out, that the class’s selective sample of successfully commercialized 
patents is not representative of the more than two million patents in 
force.30 I confirm this observation with statistics showing that nearly two-
thirds of patents are allowed to expire for failure to pay maintenance 
fees,31 and then invite the students to attempt to discern facial 
differences between their show-and-tell patents and a comparison group 
of lapsed patents. This exercise highlights the extent to which the class’s 
income-based valuations of the show-and-tell patents relied on 
postcommercialization information about markets for the patented 
products,32 and calls into question whether the students’ analytical 
 
 24. MURPHY ET AL., supra note 16, at 86 (noting that the authors frequently recommend 
forming a valuation team including a financial expert, an industry expert, and a technology 
expert); Nils Omland, Valuing Patents Through Indicators, in THE ECONOMIC VALUATION 
OF PATENTS, supra note 21, at 169 (noting that the income approach to patent valuation 
“generally builds on expert knowledge of the technology, markets, production facilities, legal 
effectiveness of the patents, and so on” and might involve “different experts, possibly even 
from different organizations”). 
 25. See MURPHY ET AL., supra note 16, at 53 (describing patent valuation as “an 
inherently inexact undertaking”). 
 26. See id. at 131 (“While the clean mathematical calculations of [an income-based 
valuation] analysis can convey an aura of precision, the quality of the analysis is entirely 
dependent on the quality of the inputs that are used in the calculation. If the inputs are 
substantially wrong, the answer that comes from the	.	.	.	analysis will be substantially wrong.”). 
 27. See Holt et al., supra note 22, at 33 (noting that a sense of the valuation process can 
help attorneys “make informed decisions as to how and when to engage an expert”). 
 28. See MURPHY ET AL., supra note 16, at 13 (“A user who understands the limits and 
implications of the inputs used to feed her chosen valuation method will be better suited than 
others to interpret and employ the resulting valuation effectively.”). 
 29. See id. at 3–4. 
 30. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 
1506–07 (2001) (“There is certainly a strong sense in the patent community that many issued 
patents, even potentially valuable ones, sit around collecting dust.”); Alan C. Marco et al., The 
USPTO Historical Patent Data Files: Two Centuries of Innovation 32 (USPTO Econ., 
Working Paper No. 2015-1, 2015) (graphing annual count of patents in force), https://www
.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTO_economic_WP_2015-01_v2.pdf [https://perma
.cc/WKZ4-7PMY]. 
 31. See Lemley, supra note 30, at 1503–04. 
 32. See infra text accompanying notes 88–105 (describing examples). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1433 (2017) 
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approaches can be extended to address precommercialization counseling 
scenarios. 
At this point, it should be apparent to the students that patent 
valuations are more typically grounded in predictions about future 
income opportunities than in extrapolations of existing income streams. 
Specifically, what is needed is a valuation methodology that incorporates 
the ex ante value of future opportunities to try to generate income from 
the patent in light of these uncertainties. This is the promise of the real 
options approach to patent valuation. 
II.  THEORY 
Despite the extensive economics literature characterizing patents as 
real options, to date relatively few legal scholars and practitioners have 
attempted to utilize this formulation for patent valuation purposes.33 
This Part briefly describes the potential applicability of real options 
theory to patent valuation and some of the pedagogical benefits of 
bringing its associated financial tools and perspectives into the law 
school classroom. 
A. Real Options and Financial Options 
“A real option is the right, but not the obligation,” to pay a 
predetermined price to undertake a potentially profitable action in the 
future.34 The notion of a real option bears a close analogy to a financial 
options contract based on an underlying security, such as a share of 
stock.35 The analogy extends to call and put options, or rights to 
purchase or sell a share of stock at a predetermined strike price, 
respectively.36 Real options also follow the terminology of financial 
options in distinguishing between European and American types. A 
European option can be exercised only on the expiration date, while an 
American option can be exercised at any time up to and including the 
expiration date.37 
 
 33. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Describing Patents as Real Options, 34 J. CORP. L. 1127, 
1128 (2009) (describing the “fairly robust economics literature” on patents as real options and 
noting that “[t]he legal literature is a bit behind in using this analogy”). 
 34. See TOM COPELAND & VLADIMIR ANTIKAROV, REAL OPTIONS: A 
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 5 (2001); see also Raffaele Oriani & Luigi Sereno, Advanced 
Valuation Methods: The Real Options Approach, in THE ECONOMIC VALUATION OF 
PATENTS, supra note 21, at 141, 142–43. 
 35. See Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147, 
147–49 (1977) (coining the term “real options” and developing the analogy between real 
options and financial options). 
 36. JANA SACKS, ELEMENTARY FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 107 (2016). 
 37. Id. at 107–08. 
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An unexpired financial option can have present value even if it 
would not be profitable to exercise it, because the underlying stock’s 
price movements may make it profitable to exercise the option at some 
time in the future.38 The market price for an option reflects this present 
value and is referred to as the option premium.39 
 
Figure 1. Net Profit from Purchasing a European Call Option at 
the Option Premium, as a Function of the Market Price of the 
Underlying Stock at Maturity.40 
 
 
 38. See BRIAN COYLE, RISK AWARENESS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 119 (2004). 
 39. See id. 
 40. Cf. ASWARTH DAMODARAN, DAMODARAN ON VALUATION app., at 444 fig. A12.1 
(2006). 
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As illustrated in Figure 1, a person who pays the option premium to 
purchase a European call option—thereby obtaining a “long position” in 
call options—will have the right to purchase a share of the underlying 
stock at the strike price when the option matures.41 It will be rational for 
the option holder to do so if the share’s market price at maturity is 
higher than the strike price, because the holder can exercise the option 
to purchase a share at the strike price, immediately sell the share at the 
higher market price, and keep the difference as the payoff. If this payoff 
exceeds the option premium, the holder will earn a positive net profit. 
B. Valuation in Theory and Practice 
The analogy to financial options is useful for understanding real 
options because there is a considerable business literature to explain and 
predict the valuation of financial options.42 Most of this research has 
focused on the Black-Scholes-Merton model of option pricing,43 which 
expresses the premium on a European call option as a function of six 
variables: the current price of the underlying stock (S), the strike price 
(X), the time to expiration (T), the standard deviation of returns on the 
underlying asset ( , also known as the asset’s volatility), the riskless 
interest rate (r), and the dividend yield ( ).44 
 
 41. SACKS, supra note 36, at 107–08. 
 42. For a survey of empirical option pricing research, see generally David S. Bates, 
Testing Option Pricing Models, in 14 HANDBOOK OF STATISTICS 567–611 (G.S. Maddala & 
C.R. Rao eds., 1996). 
 43. See David S. Bates, Empirical Option Pricing: A Retrospection, 116 J. 
ECONOMETRICS 387, 387 (2003) (noting that until recently “the overwhelming bulk of the 
empirical literature [on option pricing] was set within the BSM paradigm, with relatively few 
papers that tested alternative models”). See generally Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The 
Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973) (describing the 
model); Robert C. Merton, Theory of Rational Option Pricing, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. 
SCI. 141 (1973) (extending the model, inter alia, to incorporate dividend payouts). 
 44. See TIMOTHY FALCON CRACK, BASIC BLACK-SCHOLES: OPTION PRICING AND 
TRADING 41 (3d ed. 2014). The value of a European call option in the Black-Scholes-Merton 
model is given by the function 
, 
where 
, 
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The Black-Scholes-Merton model is based on several simplifying 
assumptions about the statistical movement of stock prices and the 
efficiency of markets. First, all investors in the options market must have 
sufficient liquidity to conduct certain hedging strategies on a continuous 
basis.45 Second, the market must have sufficient efficiency and liquidity 
to allow investors to complete all of the trades necessary for these 
strategies at fair market value, with no transaction costs and no 
possibility of arbitrage.46 Finally, the price movement of the underlying 
stock must have the statistical properties associated with geometric 
Brownian motion.47 
Because of these “severe” simplifying assumptions, there are 
substantial differences between option pricing in the Black-Scholes-
Merton model and in the real world.48 Even so, one of the model’s key 
predictions, that high stock volatility would be reflected in high options 
prices, has been confirmed in empirical studies of financial options 
markets.49 
In contrast to the financial literature, there have been relatively few 
empirical studies on the valuation of real options,50 but the real options 
literature reflects many of the same basic insights that emerge from the 
Black-Scholes-Merton model.51 Thus, the value of waiting to decide 
whether to undertake an action tends to increase with the volatility of 
the outcome.52 Other recognized drivers of real option value are also 
consistent with the partial derivatives of the Black-Scholes-Merton 
 
 45. See NEIL A. CHRISS, BLACK-SCHOLES AND BEYOND: OPTION PRICING MODELS 
201–03 (1997). 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. at 203–04. For a brief explanation of why the Black-Scholes-Merton model’s 
use of Brownian motion is a simplifying assumption, see, for example, NICO VAN DER WIJST, 
FINANCE: A QUANTITATIVE INTRODUCTION 224–26 (2013) (noting that “stocks do not only 
vary randomly,” but “are expected to move upwards”). 
 48. See CRACK, supra note 44, at 189 (providing a lengthy list of aspects in which real-
world options markets deviate from the assumptions of the Black-Scholes-Merton model, 
including the prevalence of American options, the existence of bid-ask spreads and 
commissions, and the partial predictability of stock price movements in response to news). 
 49. See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Valuation of Option Contracts and a Test of 
Market Efficiency, 27 J. FIN. 399, 416 (1972); Henry A. Latané & Richard J. Rendleman, 
Standard Deviations of Stock Price Ratios Implied in Option Prices, 31 J. FIN. 369, 369–75 
(1976). 
 50. See COPELAND & ANTIKAROV, supra note 34, at 75 (“There have been only a few 
empirical studies that compare [net present value accounting] with real options 
methodology.”). 
 51. See id. at 86–87 (describing the fact that the value of waiting to decide whether to 
undertake an action tends to increase with the volatility of the outcome, a consequence of the 
Black-Scholes-Merton model, as a “general result for [real] options”). 
 52. See id. at 86–87 (describing this proposition as a “general result for [real] options”). 
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valuation formula53: ceteris paribus, an increase in the present value of 
the opportunity, a decrease in the strike price, an increase in the time to 
expiration, an increase in volatility, an increase in the risk-free interest 
rate, and a decrease in the dividend rate will each lead to an increase in 
the real option value.54 
C. Benefits of Teaching the Real Options Approach 
If the real options literature is basically correct in its approach to 
valuation, then its central insight—that flexibility has value55—has 
considerable significance for patent valuation. The real options 
embedded in a patent may have significant value that is systematically 
neglected by income approaches to patent valuation.56 One 
commentator suggests that a real options approach to patent valuation 
would have helped Xerox recognize the potential value of many 
undeveloped ideas it discarded as “worthless[,]” such as the personal 
computer, laser printing, the Ethernet, and graphical user interfaces.57 
As Xerox’s tragic tale vividly illustrates, an attorney counseling a client 
on what to patent needs more than valuation methods based on 
postcommercialization income. The real options approach is well-suited 
to the precommercialization counseling scenario, in which income-based 
valuation methods can be used to calculate a probabilistic distribution of 
proceeds from exercising the option to commercialize. 
The real options approach to valuation provides new economic 
intuitions that can reframe classroom discussions of patent law and 
policy. In a 2009 article,58 Chris Cotropia shows how “macro patent 
elements,” or clusters of interrelated rules of patent law, affect various 
determinants of a patent’s value as a real option.59 First, a patent’s 
option premium consists of the total cost of acquiring the patent, 
including creating and developing the underlying invention, drafting, 
 
 53. See supra note 44. 
 54. See COPELAND & ANTIKAROV, supra note 34, at 5–7. 
 55. See DAMODARAN, supra note 40, at 19 (explaining suitability of option pricing 
models for promising new technologies and other kinds of assets impacted by exogenous 
contingencies for “risk can be an ally and can be exploited to generate additional value”). 
 56. See COPELAND & ANTIKAROV, supra note 34, at 24 (“Why use real options for 
evaluating investment decisions? Because Real Options Analysis values the flexibility to 
respond to uncertain events—net present value techniques do not and consequently 
undervalue everything.”). 
 57. See A. Tracy Gomes, Intellectual Property Economics on Real Options in Patent and 
Intangible Valuation, in JOHNATHAN MUN, REAL OPTIONS ANALYSIS 50, 51 (2d ed. 2006) 
(citing KEVIN RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC: UNLOCKING THE 
HIDDEN VALUE OF PATENTS 58–59 (2000)). 
 58. Cotropia, supra note 33. 
 59. See id. at 1144–45. 
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filing and prosecuting the patent application, and losing trade secret 
protection.60 Second, a patentee may try to obtain supracompetitive 
profits by opting to commercialize the invention during the period of 
exclusivity provided by the patent grant.61 The possibility of earning such 
profits will depend on the patent’s valid scope relative to the relevant 
product market62 and should be discounted to the extent that market 
exclusivity is attributable to the inventor’s first-mover advantage rather 
than the legal exclusivity afforded by the patent.63 The patent’s strike 
price in this context consists of the total cost of exclusive 
commercialization, including the costs of developing and marketing the 
product,64 policing the market against infringement by competitors,65 and 
obtaining freedom to operate.66 Alternatively, a patentee may try to 
obtain damages or royalties by opting to assert the patent against 
another company that has commercialized the invention.67 In this 
context, the strike price consists of the cost of litigation or licensing 
 
 60. See id. at 1135–37. 
 61. See id. at 1137. 
 62. See Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics Approach, J. 
ECON. PERSP., Spring 2005, at 57, 68 (“A legal monopoly is not necessarily an economic 
monopoly; if close substitutes exist for a patented product, the patent may confer little power 
over price.”). Thus, the patentee will be able to obtain supracompetitive profits only if the 
patent covers all close economic substitutes for the commercialized embodiment of the 
invention, which is not always the case. Id. 
 63. See, e.g., Oskar Liivak, Maintaining Competition in Copying: Narrowing the Scope of 
Gene Patents, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 177, 212 (2007) (noting that an inventor in a new 
technological market may have a first-mover advantage that allows abnormal profits). 
 64. See Cotropia, supra note 33, at 1137–38. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. It must be remembered that a patent does not confer a positive right to 
practice the invention; thus, the patentee may need to obtain licenses to blocking patents or 
meet regulatory approvals before commercializing a patented invention. See supra note 14 
and accompanying text. 
  In light of these and other complications, Ted Sichelman has suggested that it is more 
logical to analogize patents to put options, wherein a patent’s value subsists in the right to 
force an infringer to purchase a license, pay damages, or cease infringement. See Discussion 
with Ted Sichelman, Professor, University of San Diego School of Law (Aug. 15, 2016) (on 
file with author). While this is a valid and important critique of the call option 
characterization, it is far from clear that the put option analogy fully captures a patent’s 
economic value. See, e.g., Alan C. Marco, The Option Value of Patent Litigation: Theory and 
Evidence, 14 REV. FIN. ECON. 323, 325 (2005) (characterizing a patent as a portfolio 
consisting of the option to sue together with an asset that pays a stochastic profit flow); Oriani 
& Sereno, supra note 34, at 150–52 (describing the patentee’s option to sue as a put option, 
but also enumerating several other potentially valuable real options held by the patentee). 
Valuing a patent as a put option would also entail the estimation of patent damages, a topic 
that would not be appropriate to cover in connection with the introductory activity described 
in this Article. Oriani & Sereno, supra note 34, at 152. 
 67. See Cotropia, supra note 33, at 1138. 
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negotiations.68 Third, whereas the real options conferred by patent rights 
expire with those rights, technological or market changes may effectively 
terminate the patentee’s de facto ability to exercise those options even 
before the patent expires.69 Finally, while patent rules operate in 
principle without regard to the value of the underlying invention, scope-
limiting doctrines such as novelty, nonobviousness, and adequate 
disclosure serve in practice to limit a patent’s real option value.70 
Cotropia highlights two potential discussion topics in patent law 
that can helpfully be reframed from a real options perspective. The first 
of these concerns the controversy over whether non-practicing entities, 
often referred to as “patent trolls,” help or harm the patent system.71 To 
the extent that the assertion of patents by non-practicing entities tends 
to chill potentially beneficial entrepreneurial activities,72 this problem 
could be attributed to the low costs of acquiring and asserting a patent 
relative to the much higher costs of commercialization.73 A patent’s low 
acquisition costs can in turn be attributed to the legal rules comprising 
the “macro patent element” of the patent’s option premium, such as the 
constructive reduction to practice doctrine allowing a filed patent 
application to stand in for the acts of making and using the claimed 
invention.74 
Cotropia finds a second discussion topic in the Supreme Court’s 
2007 decision KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,75 which appears to 
have elevated the nonobviousness standard for patentability.76 To the 
 
 68. See id. at 1138–39. 
 69. See id. at 1139–40. 
 70. See id. at 1141–42. 
 71. See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 33, at 1145–47; John F. Duffy, Reviving the Paper 
Patent Doctrine, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1359, 1362–64 (2013) (providing a concise survey of the 
controversy). 
 72. See Duffy, supra note 71, at 1363 (“The practices of [nonpracticing entities] are least 
justifiable where the patents have never been practiced by any entity in the chain of patent 
ownership and are asserted against entrepreneurial firms that not only developed the 
technology independently but also took the risks associated with bringing the technology to 
market.”). 
 73. See Cotropia, supra note 33, at 1146–47. 
 74. See id. at 1146. 
 75. 550 U.S. 398 (2007); Cotropia, supra note 33, at 1147–48. 
 76. See, e.g., Ali Mojibi, An Empirical Study of the Effect of KSR v. Teleflex on the 
Federal Circuit’s Patent Validity Jurisprudence, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 559, 572–73, 596 
(2010) (finding district courts “over seven times more likely to find patents obvious as a result 
of KSR” and the Federal Circuit “more likely	.	.	.	to find a patent obvious on review”); 
Jennifer Nock & Sreekar Gadde, Raising the Bar for Nonobviousness: An Empirical Study of 
Federal Circuit Case Law Following KSR, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 369, 407 (2011) (concluding that 
since KSR, “the bar has indeed been raised for finding an invention nonobvious”); Jason 
Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empirical Study, 16 
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extent that a higher patentability standard raises the costs and risks 
associated with patent acquisition,77 the KSR decision provides an 
example of a legal change that has served to raise the option premium 
for many patents.78 When viewed from this real options perspective, 
KSR can be identified as a patent law development that might 
ameliorate the patent troll problem.79 
Beyond the potential reframing of specific topics in the patent law 
course, the real options perspective primes students to recognize 
flexibility as a strategic consideration in patent doctrine and case law. 
For example, the question of whether an invention has been put “on 
sale” (so as to bar it from patentability after one year80) often turns on 
the public policy “allowing the inventor a reasonable amount of time 
following sales activity to determine the potential economic value of a 
patent[,]”81 even if the invention has not been fully commercialized.82 
After relying heavily on future projections from postcommercialization 
data in their own patent valuations,83 students can better understand 
why the emergence of such data from an on-sale event might be an 
appropriate point from which to measure the maximum lifetime of the 
patent option.84 
III.  EXPERIENCE 
The real options approach to patent valuation can provide law 
students with new analytical tools for precommercialization counseling 
and new perspectives on patent law and policy. It is challenging to teach, 
however, because it involves quantitative techniques beyond the usual 
scope of the law school curriculum. Of course, students do not need to 
know or understand the Black-Scholes-Merton formula to appreciate 
 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 764 (2013) (“[T]he Federal Circuit has indeed found patents and 
applications to be obvious at a higher rate than it did prior to KSR	.	.	.	.”). 
 77. See Cotropia, supra note 33, at 1148. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. at 1145 (describing KSR’s nonobviousness standard as “an arguable solution” 
to the problem of patent trolls). 
 80. See 35 U.S.C. §	102(a)(1), (b)(1) (2012) (post-America Invents Act); 35 U.S.C. 
§	102(b) (2006) (pre-America Invents Act). 
 81. See Cont’l Plastic Containers v. Owens Brockway Plastic Prods., Inc., 141 F.3d 1073, 
1077 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 82. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (finding no statutory basis for 
requiring that an invention be reduced to practice before an “on sale” event can occur). 
 83. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
 84. But see Amelia S. Rinehart, Patents as Escalators, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 81, 
102–03 (2011) (arguing that the real options perspective may deter patent owners from “full 
commercialization” of patents they have been pressured to obtain early because of the on-sale 
bar). 
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that strategic flexibility has value to an entrepreneurial client facing 
technological, market, and legal uncertainty. Still, the practical exercise 
of estimating the value of a patent as a real option can suggest 
possibilities for, and limitations of, quantitative insights into the option 
value of patents at the precommercialization stage, and can lead 
students to consider how they might apply such insights in counseling 
scenarios. 
This Part suggests some pedagogical tools and approaches for 
equipping law students to apply the real options approach to patent 
valuation. The main cognitive challenge lies in the mathematical 
sophistication of the models involved: the leading methodologies for 
valuing real options presuppose that the uncertain future value of an 
underlying asset can be modeled according to a lognormal probability 
distribution.85 For students to use the real options approach in practice, 
Section A describes a simple, intuitive way to specify valuation estimates 
that uniquely determine the parameters of the associated lognormal 
distribution; Section B then describes a dedicated software application 
that will calculate these parameters and use them as inputs in the 
appropriate formula for real options valuation. 
A. Generating the Data 
As described in Part I, the small group exercise provided the 
students with an introduction to the methodologies and practices of 
patent valuation research. Importantly, the exercise also yielded all of 
the necessary inputs for the real options approach to patent valuation. In 
particular, the students were asked to provide low and high estimates of 
their patent’s postcommercialization valuation. They were also asked to 
give a confidence level, stated as an estimate of the probability that the 
actual value ultimately derived from the patent before expiration would 
fall between the low and high estimates.86 These data are sufficient to 
pick out a unique lognormal distribution whose geometric mean is equal 
to that of the two estimates. This specification approach is an attempt to 
avoid cognitive errors observed when students express uncertain beliefs 
in terms of subjective probability distributions, as well as students’ likely 
unfamiliarity with lognormal distributions.87 
 
 85. See, e.g., COPELAND & ANTIKAROV, supra note 34, at 122–23 (explaining the choice 
of the lognormal distribution as a “reasonable approximation” of the probability distribution 
of future common stock prices for options valuation purposes). 
 86. See supra text following note 23. 
 87. See Anders Winman, Patrik Hansson & Peter Juslin, Subjective Probability Intervals: 
How to Reduce Overconfidence by Interval Evaluation, 30 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 
LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 1167, 1167 (2004). 
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The following discussion describes some of the students’ 
calculations as reported from their small groups to the full class. 
 
Example 1. “Audio Earbud Headphone with Extended Curvature,” U.S. 
Patent No. 8,515,115, assigned to Skullcandy Inc. 
The student found Skullcandy’s annual report online,88 stating a 
gross profit of $109.9 million for 2015.89 The student also located a page 
on the Skullcandy web site listing all of the design and utility patents 
covering each of Skullcandy’s headphone products.90 According to the 
web page, Skullcandy’s “Fix,” “Fix In-Ear,” and “Method” lines of 
headphones are covered by two utility patents, including the ‘115 patent, 
and five design patents.91 This provided an opportunity to discuss the 
virtual marking provisions of the America Invents Act,92 as well as the 
difficulty of attributing a product’s profitability to each of several 
patents covering the product. The student did not have time to review 
the other patents in detail, but concluded that one year of actual profits 
would represent a reasonable high-end estimate of Skullcandy’s future 
earnings attributable to the ‘115 patent over the remaining fourteen 
years of the patent term. 
 
Example 2. “Ink Cartridges,” U.S. Patent No. 7,222,950, assigned to 
Brother Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha 
The student noted that in 2012, Brother had moved to a “universal-
type” shape and configuration for its black and color inkjet cartridges, 
which appeared to be covered by the claims of the ‘950 patent.93 After 
reviewing online articles on the inkjet cartridge industry,94 the student 
 
 88. For all of Skullcandy’s annual reports, see Annual Reports, SKULLCANDY, http://
investors.skullcandy.com/annuals.cfm [https://perma.cc/JUF4-PM4J]. 
 89. See Skullcandy, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) Item 6, at 20 (Mar. 4, 2016), 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ABEA-5FMQI8/4425980030x0x879697/18E48AD1-
5244-4C63-AEFD-576DC0F1AF23/SEC-ABEA-5FMQI8-1423542-16-112.pdf [https://perma
.cc/4TV5-AY3Z]. 
 90. See Patent Information, SKULLCANDY, http://www.skullcandy.com/customer-service
/patent-information/patents-page.html [https://perma.cc/T9R2-MLHB] (last updated Oct. 5, 
2016). 
 91. Id.; see also U.S. Patent No. D761,760 (filed Mar. 19, 2015); U.S. Patent No. D728,533 
(filed Mar. 31, 2014); U.S. Patent No. 9,0555,365 (filed Aug. 15, 2013); U.S. Patent No. 
D656,129 (filed June 3, 2011); U.S. Patent No. 8,515,115 (filed Aug. 20, 2010); U.S. Patent No. 
D624,057 (filed Jan. 6, 2010). 
 92. See 35 U.S.C. §	287(a) (2012) (allowing a patentee to inform the public that an article 
is patented by affixing “patent” or “pat.” on the article together with an Internet address to a 
posting “associat[ing] the patented article with the number of the patent”). 
 93. U.S. Patent No. 7,222,950 col. 10 l. 21–col. 12 l. 52 (filed Sept. 29, 2006). 
 94. See, e.g., Complex OEM Inkjet Cartridge Structures Pose a Challenge for Compatible 
Makers, ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.action-intell.com/2013/12/05
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estimated Brother’s United States sales at 119 million units over the 
effective life of the patent and attributed approximately $1 to $2 of 
Brother’s profit per unit to the market exclusivity conferred by the ‘950 
patent. The student noted that Brother had not pursued as active a 
litigation strategy as Hewlett-Packard and some other competitors and 
thus had been susceptible to parallel importing of compatible ink 
cartridges.95 Even though Brother had priced its original equipment 
manufacturer (“OEM”) cartridges at $10 to $12, the student was able to 
obtain acceptable equivalents online in bundles of six for $13. The 
student suggested that the patent valuation would increase if Brother 
adopted a more aggressive litigation posture in the future. Finally, the 
student noted the potential for consumer harm if patents broadly 
covering compatible cartridge configurations were allowed to extinguish 
price competition in the aftermarket for Brother inkjet cartridges.96 
 
Example 3. “Tape Locking Device for Tape Measure,” U.S. Patent No. 
6,595,451, assigned to Komelon Corp. 
In light of the crowded field of functionally interchangeable tape 
measures, the student reasoned that purchasers of Komelon’s tape 
measure would select it primarily, or even exclusively, for its patented 
self-locking mechanism.97 Prior art tape measures automatically retract 
unless the user actively pushes a button to lock the tape, which may be 
inconvenient for the user and damaging to the tape. The student stated 
that Komelon’s annual report identifies measuring tapes as one of seven 
product groups, but does not itemize its profit reporting by product 
group.98 The student estimated that measuring tapes constituted one-
seventh of Komelon’s sales, and that one-third of Komelon’s measuring 
tapes included the patented feature, so that 1/21 of Komelon’s net 
 
/complex-oem-inkjet-cartridge-structures-pose-a-challenge-for-compatible-makers/ [https://
perma.cc/UJ3B-EM2V]. 
 95. See Charles Brewer, OEMs Keep Pressure on Vendors Marketing Infringing Ink and 
Toner Supplies, ENX MAG. (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.enxmag.com/twii/news-briefing/2015/02
/oems-keep-pressure-on-vendors-marketing-infringing-ink-and-toner-supplies/ [http://perma.cc
/7FHT-LFSY]. 
 96. See Larry F. Darby & Stephen B. Pociask, Inkjet Prices, Printing Costs and Consumer 
Welfare, AM. CONSUMER INST. (Nov. 19, 2007), http://www.theamericanconsumer.org/2007/11
/inkjet-prices-printing-costs-and-consumer-welfare/ [https://perma.cc/7CCQ-M5YK]. 
 97. See U.S. Patent No. 6,595,451 abstract (filed Jan. 29, 2002). 
 98. See Audio recording: Patent Law, Law 286, Fall 2016, University of North Carolina 
School of Law (Sept. 6, 2016) (on file with author); see also Komelon Corp: 049430 Financial 
Summary, INVESTING.COM, http://www.investing.com/equities/komelon-corp-financial-
summary [https://perma.cc/87DL-CJN9 (staff-uploaded archive)] (last updated Apr. 14, 2017). 
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annual profits, or $522,000, could be attributed to the patented feature.99 
He then applied a ten percent discount rate over the 5.5-year life of the 
patent to estimate a range for the patent’s valuation. 
 
Example 4. “Smart Light Bulb,” U.S. Patent No. 6,528,954, assigned to 
Color Kinetics Inc.100 
The student presented a third-party iPhone-controllable LED light 
bulb that apparently fell within the scope of the ‘954 patent.101 The 
student reviewed PowerPoint slides from a presentation on Philips’s 
LED light bulb patent licensing program102 and concluded that the third-
party bulb had likely been manufactured under license from Philips. 
From a world industry report for LED manufacturing,103 the student 
found that the total profit for the industry was $82.5 million with a 
projected annual growth rate of 3.4%.104 Philips is estimated to have a 
market share of 43.1%.105 From these numbers, the student estimated 
Philips’s profits from LED manufacturing over the remaining two years 
of the patent term and used these estimates as the range for the ‘954 
patent’s valuation. 
 
 99. See Audio recording, supra note 98; see also Komelon Corp: 049490 Financial 
Summary, supra note 98. 
 100. Royal Philips Electronics acquired Color Kinetics in 2007. See Color Kinetics 
Announces Acquisition By Philips, PR NEWSWIRE (June 19, 2007), http://www.prnewswire
.com/news-releases/color-kinetics-announces-acquisition-by-philips-58151087.html [https://
perma.cc/6USY-BY7F]. 
 101. See U.S. Patent No. 6,528,954 abstract (filed Dec. 17, 1998). 
 102. Philips Intellectual Property & Standards, LED Luminaires and Retrofit Bulbs 
Licensing Program, PHILIPS (June 21, 2016), http://www.ip.philips.com/data/downloadables
/1/5/2/5/philips-led-luminaire-licensing-program-_final_20160621.pdf [https://perma.cc/28FF-
25VZ]. 
 103. See generally JUSTIN MOLAVI, IBISWORLD INDUSTRY REPORT OD4456, LED 
MANUFACTURING IN THE US (2011) (detailing the state of the LED chip and component 
manufacturing industry in 2011). 
 104. See id. at 3; see also Jennifer Kho, New Partnership Aims to Make LEDs Cost 
Competitive, FORBES (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jenniferkho/2012/11/07/new-
partnership-aims-to-make-leds-cost-competitive [http://perma.cc/MTG2-C7YL]. 
 105. See MOLAVI, supra note 103, at 3; see also Kho, supra note 104. 
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Table 1. Summary of Example Student Valuations of Show-and-Tell 
Patents Using the Income Approach 
 
Description Patent No. Life Low High Confidence 
Headphone 8,515,115 14 yrs. $70m $109m 85% 
Ink cartridge 7,222,950 9 yrs. $100m $250m 60% 
Tape measure 6,595,451 5.5 yrs. $1m $2m 50% 
Light bulb 6,528,954 2 yrs. $36m $44m 50% 
 
Students commonly attributed a company’s entire profits for a 
patented product to the patent itself, as exemplified by those in 
Examples 3 and 4.106 This tendency might be due in part to the students’ 
lack of previous exposure to patents and to cases on patent remedies 
calling for a more nuanced apportionment of profits.107 In this regard, 
the students are not alone. Patent owners may be subject to endowment 
effects that lead them to systematically overestimate the value of their 
patent holdings.108 Courts also often overestimate the contribution of a 
patented invention to the success of a product in the market when 
valuing patents in the infringement context.109 The Patent Act allowed 
the owner of a utility patent to recover an infringer’s entire profits until 
1946,110 and continues to allow the owner of a design patent such a 
remedy to this day.111 
 
 106. See supra text accompanying notes 97–105. 
 107. See, e.g., Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1119–20 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970) (providing multifactor analysis for determining reasonable royalty), modified and aff’d, 
446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 108. See Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: 
An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 32–34 (2010) (finding a significant endowment effect 
in a market for copyrights, and raising concerns about related inefficiencies resulting from 
initial entitlements in the patent context). 
 109. See, e.g., John W. Schlicher, Patent Damages, the Patent Reform Act, and Better 
Alternatives for the Courts and Congress, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 19, 22 (2009) 
(“Patents that make available an entirely new type of product are rare. Nonetheless, the 
courts frequently find that some patented variation of an old product is the basis for an 
infringing company’s entire revenue and profits.”). 
 110. Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 726, §	1, 60 Stat. 778, 778 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 
§	289 (2012)). See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Damages 
Rules in Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1585, 1595–96, 1596 n.45 (1998). 
 111. See 35 U.S.C. §	289 (2012); see also Mark A. Lemley, A Rational System of Design 
Patent Remedies, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 219, 219 (2013) (criticizing the continuing 
availability of the “entire profit” remedy for design patent infringement). 
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B. Processing (and Tinkering with) the Data 
To aid students in estimating the value of their patents as real 
options, I developed a beta version of a web-based “Patent Valuation 
Calculator”112 that uses numerical methods to estimate the value of the 
option to commercialize as an American call option. As shown in Figure 
2, the calculator asks for an estimated range for the 
postcommercialization profits attributable to the patent, together with 
an estimate of the probability that the actual value derived from the 
patent ultimately will fall within this estimated range. It also asks for an 
estimate of the cost of commercializing the invention, the time to 
expiration and the riskless interest rate. The calculator uses sliders for its 
input interface, with the aim of inviting the students to test different 
input values. The students can use the estimated patent valuations that 
they obtained using the income approach as starting points113 and then 
experiment to observe the effect of changing each parameter. 
Since the option to exploit a patent through commercialization can 
be profitably exercised only before the patent expires,114 it is appropriate 
to regard patents as American options for valuation purposes.115 In 
finance, binomial models are used to account for the profits attributable 
to exercising an American option at different points in time prior to the 
expiration of the option.116 Since a decision to commercialize can take 
place at any time, a binomial model of patent value should divide the 
patent term into many short time steps, so that the numerical calculation 
approaches a continuous-time analysis.117 The calculation can be 
computationally intensive, as more time steps necessitate more nodes in 
the binomial tree from which the option value must be calculated.118 The 
Patent Valuation Calculator allows the user to trade off speed for 
precision by selecting the number of nodes in the binomial model. 
 
 
 112. Andrew Chin, Patent Valuation Calculator, ANDREW CHIN, http://unclaw.com/chin
/valuation/ [https://perma.cc/7EZF-5D76]. 
 113. See supra text accompanying note 23. 
 114. To some extent, this is a simplifying assumption, since patent rights may confer 
indirect benefits such as goodwill and economies of scale after expiration. See MURPHY ET 
AL., supra note 16, at 126–27. 
 115. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (explaining European and American 
options). The opportunity cost of delaying commercialization is modeled as an annual 
dividend rate equal to the reciprocal of the number of years in the effective patent term. 
 116. See KERRY BACK, A COURSE IN DERIVATIVE SECURITIES 89–91 (2005) (introducing 
binomial models and explaining their applicability to American options pricing). 
 117. See John C. Cox, Stephen A. Ross & Mark Rubinstein, Option Pricing: A Simplified 
Approach, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 229, 250–54 (1979) (proving convergence). 
 118. See VAN DER WIJST, supra note 47, at 216–17 (explaining convergence of binomial 
model to Black-Scholes model as the number of nodes approaches infinity). 
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Figure 2. Web-Based Calculator for Estimating Patent Valuation 
Using the Real Options Approach119 
 
 
 
 119. Chin, supra note 112. 
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As students observe the effects of changing each input on the 
valuation of their patent as a real option, they can begin thinking 
through the logic of the real options perspective and its implications for 
patent acquisition, commercialization, and assertion. They can 
immediately see that a patent may have significant value even when 
immediately exercising the commercialization option would have a 
negative expected net value (in financial terms, the option is “out of the 
money”).120 They can also see that longer patent terms and lower 
interest rates marginally enhance the real option value of a patent. 
Further experimentation with the Patent Valuation Calculator’s 
sliders eventually leads most students to recognize that the real options 
approach to patent valuation relies heavily on the estimated profits 
attributable to commercializing the patented invention over the effective 
life of the patent, the level of uncertainty regarding these profits, and the 
estimated cost of commercialization. Specifically, the students should 
observe that, ceteris paribus, wider ranges for estimated profits from 
commercialization and lower levels of confidence with respect to these 
estimates result in higher calculated valuations. 
The observation that uncertainty may enhance the value of a patent 
warrants a brief cautionary discussion with the students. I explain that 
the Patent Valuation Calculator is based on a model that assumes the 
uncertainty in commercialization profits is due to random, incremental 
changes in the expectation of those profits that accrue over the patent’s 
remaining lifetime (i.e., the same Brownian motion assumption 
underlying the Black-Scholes-Merton model121). Under this assumption, 
greater uncertainty implies a greater probability of very high or very low 
profits, and a greater value in waiting to learn which state of the world 
will obtain.122 Perceptive students should acknowledge that the 
uncertainty in their income forecasts may not be of the kind that implies 
a greater likelihood of very high profits, but may simply reflect a lack of 
available data. Despite the efforts of some scholars to square the 
circle,123 the second kind of uncertainty cannot be justifiably used as a 
 
 120. JOE DUARTE, FUTURES AND OPTIONS FOR DUMMIES 58 (2006) (“Calls are out of 
the money when the strike price is greater than the market price of the underlying security.”). 
 121. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 122. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
 123. See F. Russell Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and 
the Complex Mathematics of Patent Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1213–14 (2003) 
(arguing that an analogy between patent license prices and photon positions, together with 
“recognizing a wave-particle duality in pricing[,]” implies that “the uncertainty of future 
profits provides a perfect substitute for past trading history” as a proxy for the market 
volatility of patent value). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1433 (2017) 
2017] PATENT VALUATION 1457 
proxy for volatility in the market value of the patent.124 Unfortunately, 
entrepreneurial clients characteristically operate under this second kind 
of uncertainty, as Gordon Smith’s contribution to this Symposium Issue 
emphasizes.125 
Despite the difficulties facing the valuation of patents as real 
options in practice, the small group and calculator exercises can 
helpfully guide students toward a critical evaluation of their own and 
their peers’ strategic analyses of their show-and-tell patents. As with 
other online calculators I have developed for use in my law teaching,126 I 
hope that practitioners will also find the Patent Valuation Calculator 
helpful in developing their own understandings of the real options 
approach to patent valuation. 
CONCLUSION 
Students of patent law can benefit from an early encounter with the 
entrepreneurial perspective on the value of patents. One or two class 
sessions centered on a practice group discussion of show-and-tell patents 
suffice to convey most of the useful concepts of patent valuation and a 
 
 124. Denton and Heald’s concept of “wave-particle duality in pricing” does not appear 
elsewhere in the finance literature, and the analogy is offered without any apparent 
foundation in statistics or physics. See id. (conceding that “[u]pon first exposure this approach 
might appear to be alien, untenably ambiguous, or altogether fantastic, but no other viable 
alternatives have emerged”). See generally MURPHY ET AL., supra note 16, at 174 (“Currently, 
there is nothing that constitutes a usable measurement for the cash flow volatility associated 
with an individual patent.”). 
 125. See D. Gordon Smith, Insider Trading and Entrepreneurial Action, 95 N.C. L. REV. 
1507, 1509–10 (2017) (noting the distinction between “situations in which the distribution of 
potential outcomes is quantifiable” and “situations in which the distribution of potential 
outcomes is unquantifiable” and arguing that the role of the entrepreneur is to navigate into 
the second kind of situation). The original formulation of this distinction in the economics 
literature is attributed to Frank Knight. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND 
PROFIT 232 (1921) (distinguishing “measurable uncertainties” from “that higher form of 
uncertainty not susceptible to measurement and hence to elimination”). 
 126. See Andrew Chin, Gibrat Market Simulator, ANDREW CHIN, http://unclaw.com/chin
/teaching/antitrust/gibrat.htm [https://perma.cc/VE9D-D9AQ] (modeling market concentration 
under assumptions of lognormally distributed firm growth); Andrew Chin, Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index Calculator, ANDREW CHIN, http://unclaw.com/chin/teaching/antitrust
/herfindahl.htm [https://perma.cc/ZR8Y-ELVC] (calculating a measure of market 
concentration used in antitrust analysis of mergers); Andrew Chin, Monopoly and Market 
Performance, ANDREW CHIN, http://unclaw.com/chin/teaching/antitrust/monopoly.htm 
[https://perma.cc/95QS-8KYJ] (modeling supply, demand, and market-clearing prices in a 
commodity market under conditions of monopoly and perfect competition); ANDREW CHIN, 
Short-Swing Profit Liability Calculator, ANDREW CHIN, http://16b.law.unc.edu/ [https://perma
.cc/83NU-8X9J] (calculating short-swing liability under section 16(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act under the Smolowe “lowest-in, highest-out” formula and under the more 
accurate simplex algorithm for linear programming). 
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sense of its inexactness.127 An introductory unit on patent valuation, 
including the consideration of the real option value of patents, can open 
up opportunities to discuss business perspectives on cases and topics 
throughout the patent law course, and can bring future patent attorneys 
into a closer engagement with valuation practice throughout their 
careers.128 
 
 
 127. See supra notes 25–26. But cf. David H. Goldenberg & Jonathan D. Linton, The 
Patent Paradox—New Insights Through Decision Support Using Compound Options, 79 
TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 180, 180 (2012) (concluding that $556,000 is the 
minimum real option value a patent must have to be worthwhile at the time of filing). 
 128. See supra text accompanying note 10. 
